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ABSTRACT 
Manuscript type: Empirical 
Research question: Recent dynamics in the institutional and market environment facilitated 
the propagation of equity incentive plans outside the US and the UK. This study sheds light 
on the reasons behind the diffusion of these plans in a country, Italy, where companies are 
usually controlled by a blockholder and these instruments were almost absent. 
Research findings: To gain a deep understanding of the phenomenon, we collected data on 
both the diffusion and the technical aspects of equity incentive plans adopted by Italian listed 
companies in 1999 and 2005. The results show that (i) the determinant of their adoption is the 
firm size rather than the absence of a controlling shareholder; (ii) these plans are not 
extensively used to extract company value, although few cases suggest this possibility; and 
(iii) plans’ characteristics generally comply with the requirements in tax law so that fiscal 
benefits can be accessed. 
Theoretical/Academic implications: Our findings contribute to expand the traditional 
knowledge on reasons behind the adoption of equity incentive plans outside Anglo-Saxon 
countries. Further, they provide support for a symbolic perspective of corporate governance, 
according to which the introduction of new governance practices may not imply substantive 
governance reforms. 
Practitioner/Policy implications: Our study recommends policymakers to improve the 
disclosure rules about these plans, and to avoid the introduction of fiscal benefits that 
incentive the diffusion of some compensation schemes respect to others. Moreover, our 
results encourage members of remuneration committees to pay attention to specific 
characteristics of the plans. 
 Keywords: Corporate Governance, Equity Incentive Plans, Diffusion of Governance 
Practices, Italy.  




Past studies have brought to light the dissimilarities in the pay packages of managers in 
Anglo-Saxon countries as compared to other nations (e.g. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002; 
Cheffins and Thomas, 2004; Zattoni, 2007). In the UK and, above all, in the US remuneration 
encompasses a variety of components, and short and long term variable pay carries more 
weight than elsewhere (Conyon and Murphy, 2000). In other countries, however, fixed wages 
have always been the main ingredient in top managers’ pay schemes. Over time, variable 
short term pay has become more substantial, and the impact of fringe benefits has gradually 
grown. Notwithstanding, incentives linked to reaching medium to long term company goals 
have never been widely used (Towers Perrin, 2000). 
In recent years, however, pay packages of managers have undergone an appreciable 
change as variable pay has increased considerably, even outside the US and the UK. In 
particular, managers in most countries have experienced an increase in the variable pay 
related to long term goals. Within the context of this general trend toward medium and long 
term incentives, there is a pronounced tendency to adopt plans involving stocks or stock 
options (Towers Perrin, 2000 and 2005). The drivers of the diffusion of long term incentive 
plans seem to be some recent changes in the institutional and market environment at local and 
global level. Particularly important triggers of the convergence towards the US pay paradigm 
are both market oriented drivers such as the evolving share ownership patterns or the 
internationalization of the labor market, and law-oriented drivers such as corporate or tax 
regulation (Cheffins and Thomas, 2004). Driven by these changes in the institutional and 
market environment, we observe a global trend toward the “Americanization of international 
pay practices”, characterized by high incentives and very lucrative compensation mechanisms 
(e.g. Cheffins, 2003; Cheffins and Thomas, 2004). 
Ironically, the spread of the US pay paradigm around the world happens when it is hotly 
debated at home. In particular, the critics concern both the level of executive compensation 
packages, and the use of equity incentive plans (Cheffins and Thomas, 2004). Critics stressed 
that US top managers, and particularly the CEOs, receive very lucrative compensation 
packages. The ‘80s and ‘90s saw an increasing disparity between CEO’s pay and that of rank-
and-file workers. Thanks to this effect, their direct compensation has become hundred times 
that of an average employee (Hall and Liebman, 1998). The main determinants of the 
increasing level of CEOs’ and executives’ compensation are annual bonuses and, above all, 
stock option grants (Conyon and Murphy, 2000). Stock option plans have been recently 
criticized by scholars and public opinion because their characteristics are too generous and 
symptomatic of a managerial extraction of the firm’s value (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2006). 
In light of these recent events and of the increased tendency to adopt equity incentive 
plans, this paper aims at understanding the reasons behind the dissemination of stock option 
and stock granting plans outside the US and the UKi. The choice to investigate this 
phenomenon in Italy relies on the following arguments. First, the large majority of previous 
studies analyze the evolution of executive compensation and equity incentive plans in the US 
and, to a smaller extent, in the UK. Second, ownership structure and governance practices in 
continental European countries are substantially different from the ones in Anglo-Saxon 
countries. Third, continental European countries, and Italy in particular, almost ignored the 
use of these instruments until the end of the ‘90s.  
Our aim is to compare the explanatory power of three competing views on the diffusion 
of equity incentive plans: (i) the optimal contracting view, which states that compensation 
packages are designed to minimize agency costs between managers and shareholders (Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990); (ii) the rent extraction view, which states that powerful insiders may 
influence the pay process for their own benefit (Bebchuk et al., 2002); and (iii) the perceived-
cost view (Hall and Murphy, 2003), which states that companies may favor some 
compensation schemes for their (supposed or real) cost advantages.  
To this purpose, we made an empirical study on the reasons why Italian listed 
companies adopted equity incentive plans since the end of the ‘90s. To gain a deep 
understanding of the phenomenon, we collected data and information both on the evolution of 
national institutional environment in the last decade, and on the diffusion and the 
characteristics (i.e. technical aspects and objectives) of equity incentive plans adopted by 
Italian listed companies in 1999 and 2005. We used both logit models and difference-of-
means statistical techniques to analyze data. Our results show that (i) firm size, and not its 
ownership structure, is a determinant of the adoption of these instruments; (ii) these plans are 
not extensively used to extract company value, although few cases suggest this possibility; 
and (iii) plans’ characteristics are coherent with the ones defined by tax law to receive special 
fiscal treatment.  
Our findings contribute developing the literature on both the rationales behind the 
spreading of equity incentive schemes, and the diffusion of new governance practices. They 
show, in fact, that equity incentive plans have been primarily adopted to take profit of large 
tax benefits, and that in some occasions they may have been used by controlling shareholders 
to extract company value at the expense of minority shareholders. In other words, our findings 
suggest that Italian listed companies adopted equity incentive plans to perform a subtle form 
of decoupling. On the one hand, they declared that plans were aimed to align shareholders’ 
and managers’ interests, and incentive value creation. On the other hand, thanks to the lack of 
transparency and previous knowledge about these instruments, companies used these 
mechanisms to take advantage of tax benefits, and sometimes also to distribute a large amount 
of value to some powerful subjects. These results support a symbolic perspective on corporate 
governance, according to which the introduction of equity incentive plans please stakeholders 
– for their implicit alignment of interests and incentive to value creation – without implying a 
substantive improvement of governance practices.  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Corporate governance in Italian listed companies 
Italian companies are traditionally controlled by a large blockholder (Zattoni, 1999). Banks 
and other financial institutions do not own large shareholdings and do not exert a significant 
influence on governance of large companies, at least as far as they are able to repay their 
financial debt (Bianchi, Bianco, and Enriques, 2001). Institutional investors usually play a 
marginal role because of their limited shareholding, their strict connections with Italian banks, 
and a regulatory environment that does not incentive their activism. Finally, the stock market 
is relatively small and undeveloped, and the market for corporate control is almost absent 
(Bianco, 2001). In short, the Italian governance system can be described as a system of ‘weak 
managers, strong blockholders and unprotected minority shareholders’ (Melis, 2000: 354). 
The board of directors is traditionally one tier, but shareholders’ general meeting must 
appoint also a board of statutory auditors whose main task is to monitor directors’ 
performance (Melis, 2000). Further, some researches published in the ‘90s showed that the 
board of directors was under the relevant influence of large blockholders. Both inside and 
outside directors were in fact related to controlling shareholders by family or business ties 
(Melis, 1999 and 2000; Molteni, 1997).  
Coherently with this picture, fixed wages have been the main ingredient of top 
managers’ remuneration and incentive schemes linked to reaching medium to long term 
company goals have never been widely used (Melis, 1999). Equity incentives schemes 
adopted by Italian companies issue stocks to all employees unconditionally for the purpose of 
improving company atmosphere and stabilizing the share value on the Stock Exchange. Only 
very few can be compared to stock options plans in the true sense of the term. Even in this 
case, however, directors and top managers were rarely evaluated through stock returns, 
because of the supposed limited ability of the Italian stock market to measure firm’s 
performance (Melis, 1999).  
 
The evolution of Italian institutional context in the last decade 
The institutional context in Italy has evolved radically in the last decade, creating the 
possibility for the dissemination of equity incentive plans. The main changes regarded the 
development of commercial law, the introduction and the update of the code of good 
governance, the issue of some reports encouraging the use of equity incentive plans, and the 
evolution of the tax law (Zattoni, 2006). 
Concerning the national law and regulations, some reforms in the commercial law 
(1998, 2003 and 2005) and the introduction (1999) and update (2002) of the national code of 
good governance contributed to improve the corporate governance of listed companies 
(Zattoni, 2006). Financial markets and corporate law reforms improved the efficiency of the 
Stock Exchange and created an institutional environment more favorable to institutional 
investors’ activism (Bianchi and Enriques, 2005). At the same time the introduction and 
update of the code of good governance contributed to improve governance practices at board 
level. These reforms did not produce an immediate effect on governance practices of Italian 
listed companies, although they contributed to improve, slowly and with some delay, their 
governance standards (Zattoni, 2006).  
Beyond the evolution of governance practices, some changes in the institutional 
environment affected directly the diffusion and the characteristics of equity incentive plans. 
Both the white paper of the Ministry of the Industry and Foreign Commerce and the code of 
good governance issued by the national Stock Exchange invited companies to implement 
equity incentive plans in order to develop a value creation culture in Italian companiesii. 
Furthermore, in 1997 fiscal regulations were enacted allowing tax exemption on the shares 
received through an equity incentive plan. According to the new regulation, which took effect 
on 1 January 1998, issuance of new stocks to employees by an employer or another company 
belonging to the same group did not represent compensation in kind for income tax purposes 
(Autuori, 2001). In the following years, the evolution of tax rules reduced the generous 
benefits associated with the use of equity incentive plans, but also the new rules continued to 
favor the dissemination of these plansiii.  
Driven by these changes in the institutional context, equity incentive plans became 
widely diffused among Italian listed companies at the end of the ‘90s (Zattoni, 2006). 
Ironically, the diffusion of these instruments – in Italy and in other countries such as Germany 
(Bernhardt, 1999), Spain (Alvarez Perez and Neira Fontela, 2005), and Japan (Nagaoka, 
2005) – took place when they were strongly debated in the US for their unpredicted 
consequences and the malpractices associated with their use (Bebchuk et al., 2002).  
 
The rationales explaining the adoption of equity incentive plans 
Equity incentive plans are a main component of executive compensation in the US. Their use 
is mostly founded on the argument that they give managers an incentive to act in the 
shareholders’ interests by providing a direct link between their compensation and firm stock-
price performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Beyond that, equity incentive plans have also 
other positive features, as they may contribute to attract and retain highly motivated 
employees, to encourage beneficiaries to risk taking, and to reduce direct cash expenses for 
executive compensation (Hall and Murphy, 2003). 
Despite all their positive features, the use of equity incentive plans is increasingly 
debated in the US. In particular, critics question their presumed effectiveness in guaranteeing 
the alignment of executives’ and shareholders’ interests. They point out that these instruments 
may be adopted to fulfill other objectives, such as to extract value at shareholders expenses 
(e.g. Bebchuck and Fried, 2006), or even to achieve a (real or perceived) reduction in 
compensation costs (e.g. Murphy, 2002). In synthesis, the actual debate indicates that three 
different rationales may explain the dissemination and the specific features of equity incentive 
plans: a) the optimal contracting view (Jensen and Murphy, 1990); b) the rent extraction view 
(Bebchuk et al., 2002); and c) the perceived-cost view (Hall and Murphy, 2003).  
According to the optimal contracting view, executive compensation packages are 
designed to minimize agency costs between top managers (agents) and shareholders 
(principals) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The boards of directors are effective governance 
mechanisms aimed at maximizing shareholders value and the top management’s 
compensation scheme is designed to serve this objective (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Providing 
managers with equity incentive plans may mitigate managerial self-interest by aligning the 
interests of managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Following the alignment 
rationale, equity incentives may improve firm performance, as managers are supposed to 
work for their own and shareholders’ benefit (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). In short, these 
instruments are designed to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders, and to 
motivate the former to pursue the creation of share value (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  
Agency costs are high when there is a separation between ownership and control (Berle 
and Means, 1932). Dispersed shareholding and the absence of large blockholders force 
shareholders to delegate decision making to top managers, and drastically reduce 
shareholders’ incentives and ability to effectively monitor their behaviors (e.g. Hart, 1995; 
Shleifer and Visnhy, 1997)iv. In these circumstances, the risks of management’s abuse 
increase and the adoption of equity incentive plans may contribute to align top managers’ and 
shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Shleifer and Visnhy, 1997). When 
ownership structure is concentrated, the controlling shareholders may though nominee 
themselves or appoint their own nominees as members of the board of directors (e.g. Melis, 
1999). Consequently, managers are restricted in the pursuit of their personal objectives to the 
detriment of shareholders, and there is not a strong need to use equity incentive plans to align 
managers’ and shareholders’ interests (Zattoni, 2007). In this situation, in fact, agency costs 
can be effectively reduced by using tools other than incentive schemes. Therefore, following 
the optimal contracting view we would expect the next relationship to hold: 
 
Hypothesis 1: companies with no controlling shareholder will adopt equity incentive 
plans more often than companies with a controlling shareholder. 
 
According to the rent extraction (or managerial-power) view, powerful insiders may 
influence the pay process for their own gain at the expense of shareholders (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2006). According to this view, rent extraction is facilitated by ineffective corporate 
boards, in which outside directors act under the influence of powerful executives, are often 
sympathetic to managers, or are simply ineffectual in overseeing compensation practices 
(Bebchuk et al., 2002). As a result, boards do not implement optimal compensation packages, 
and top managers receive pay in excess (i.e. a rent) of the level that would be optimal for 
shareholders. Market forces are hardly strong enough to limit this behavior; they instead 
provide incentives for structuring compensation packages in a way that camouflages the 
presence and the extent of rent extraction (Bebchuk et al., 2002). There are several 
characteristics of these instruments that seem to be coherent with this view: the lack of 
adjustments for industry and market returns, the uniform use of at-the-money options, the lack 
of lock-up mechanisms, and so on (Bebchuk et al., 2002).  
While in the US and the UK top managers are the most powerful insiders, in Italy (and 
in many other continental European countries) large blockholders play such role (Barca and 
Becht, 2001). Controlling shareholders may nominee themselves, or their relatives, as 
directors and top managers of their companies (e.g. Melis, 1999; Molteni, 1997), and have the 
power to influence the board decision making (Melis, 1999 and 2000). Thanks to their power 
as owners, directors and (sometimes also) managers, controlling shareholders may extract 
private benefits of control at minority shareholders’ expense (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer, 1999). To this purpose, they may use different techniques such as (i) increasing their 
compensation as managers and directors; (ii) using corporate assets for personal purposes; 
(iii) transferring wealth from operating companies to holding companies through the inter-
group exchanges of goods, services and financial resources; (iv) exploiting business 
opportunities through another company they own; and so on (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer, 2000). Some studies showed that private benefits of control are 
particularly high in Italy, supporting the view that controlling shareholders of Italian listed 
companies may extract a large amount of value at the minority shareholders’ expenses (e.g. 
Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004).  
Equity incentive plans are instruments that may be particularly effective to extract value 
from the company. They allow, in fact, controlling shareholders to transfer a large amount of 
money camouflaging the sum at the grant date, and to hide the extraction of value because 
these plans are perceived as instruments aimed at solving governance problems and fostering 
value creation (e.g. Bebchuk et al., 2002). To reach this purpose, controlling shareholders 
may design very generous plans targeted to them as top managers or directors of the 
corporation. Generous plans are that ones with (i) a strike price lower than the market value, 
(ii) no relationship with company’s performance, and (iii) no lock-up provisions (Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2006; Bebchuk, et al., 2002). Thus, following the rent extraction view we would 
expect the next relationship to hold: 
 
Hypothesis 2: the equity incentive plans targeted to top managers or directors will 
differ from plans offered to a large number of employees. In particular, plans targeted 
to top managers and directors will have more often (i) a strike price lower that the 
market value; (ii) no relationship with company’s performance; and (iii) no lock-up 
provisions. 
 
According to the perceived-cost view, the popularity of equity incentive plans largely reflects 
their favorable tax and accounting treatments (Murphy, 2002). Boards of directors are 
convinced that equity incentives are cheap to grant because, until few years ago, there were no 
accounting costs and no cash outlays. Moreover, under U.S. accounting and tax rules in vigor 
before the introduction of SFAS 123R, when the option was exercised, accounting income 
was unchanged and taxable income reduced (Murphy, 2002). Even if the value of these plans 
is disclosed in footnotes to the annual report and financial markets are (reasonably) efficient, 
managers consider only the accounting consequences of alternative compensation tools (Hall 
and Murphy, 2003). The favorable accounting and tax treatments make the perceived cost of 
an option much lower than the economic costs. The large diffusion of broad-based plans and 
the development of plans that conform to the evolution of accounting and tax regulations 
seem to support this view (Murphy, 2002).  
Summing up, following the perceived-cost view equity incentives may be utilized by 
companies to cushion the impact of labor costs on profit and loss accounts (Hall and Murphy, 
2003). In the period investigated in the study, the law in force in Italy did not imply an 
accounting cost on these plans. Furthermore, accounting practices have been changed only at 
the end of the period, and for this reason they did not have a relevant effect on explaining the 
diffusion and the characteristics of plans in this time frame. On the other hand, the tax 
regulation changed substantially with a potential effect on the characteristics of plans. In 
particular, according to the tax law in force between 1998 and 1999, the tax benefits were 
valid only if the operation involved (i) employees of the company, and not its directors, and 
(ii) newly issued shares, and not firm’s shares purchased on the market. Furthermore, tax law 
did not impose any requirement about the level of the strike price. The tax law in force after 
2000 changed the rules to tap into tax benefits: (i) including plans targeted to directors; (ii) 
extending benefits to operations which involve buying previously issued stocks; and (iii) 
imposing that options or shares were offered at least at market value. So, following the 
perceived-cost view we would expect the next relationship to hold: 
 
Hypothesis 3: equity incentive plans issued in Italy in the period 2004-2005 will differ 
from plans issued in the period 1998-1999. In particular, plans issued in 2004-2005 will 
be characterized by (i) the larger participation of directors; (ii) the larger use of 
previously issued shares; and (iii) the larger adoption of an exercise price offered at 
market value.  
 
METHODS 
Sample and data collection 
Our sample includes all Italian listed companies at the end of 1999 and 2005. At the end of 
1999 there were 238 Italian listed companies. The number of listed companies in the Italian 
Stock exchange increased in the period between 2000 and 2005, because there were 12 
companies going public in excess of cancellations and de-listings. So, at the end of 2005 there 
were 250 Italian listed companies.  
We collected information both on the companies and the plans. For each listed company 
we collected market capitalization (in million euros), industry classification adopted by the 
Stock Exchange (manufacturing, services, and financial industries), direct ownership structure 
(name of first shareholder and its shareholding), ultimate ownership structure (checking if the 
ultimate controlling shareholder was a family or the State), presence of a syndicate agreement 
among shareholders, and number of plans implemented. This information was collected from 
reports of the Italian Stock Exchange and Consob (the Italian financial market regulator), and 
from companies’ annual reports. 
The synthetic profile of Italian listed companies at the end of 1999 and 2005 is 
presented in table 1. The table shows that (i) Italian listed firms are more represented in 
manufacturing and financial industries in 1999, while they are more evenly distributed in 
2005; (ii) a large number of companies is under the influence of a controlling shareholder that 
is usually represented by a family; (iii) a large number of companies went public in the period 
investigated; (iv) 60 companies issued equity incentive plans in 1998-1999 and 57 companies 
adopted these instruments in 2004-2005.  
 
Insert table 1 about here 
 
The information on the features of equity incentive plans was collected from 
companies’ annual reports for the years 1999 and 2005. We focused on plans issued in the 
two preceding years (1998-1999 and 2004-2005) to collect enough information on each plan. 
This information was independently codified and analyzed by both scholars. Specifically, for 
each plan an attempt was made to reconstruct: 1) the date the plan was approved; 2) the 
content of the offer: options or shares; 3) the recipients’ categories: employees, managers, 
directors, or other categories; 4) the technical methods utilized: the issue of new shares or the 
purchase of own shares on the market; 5) the price of issuance on stock, or the exercise price 
on options: at market level or below market level; 6) if the plan included some conditions to 
compensate recipients: characteristics of recipients or company’s economic or financial 
performance; 7) the goal that inspired the plan: incentive and align, attract and retain, foster 
the employees’ identity; 8) the time horizon: vesting and exercise period; 9) the number of 
beneficiaries; 10) the presence of lock-up provisions. We used characteristics of equity 
incentive plans both to discriminate plans issued in different periods or targeted to different 
recipients, and to analyze their differences with t-test for difference of means. 
By opting to focus on listed firms, it was possible to reconstruct the main characteristics 
of equity incentive plans. However, the data-gathering process drew attention to certain 
problems that were difficult to overcome. First, information from corporate annual reports 
varied greatly in terms of scope and detail. In particular, while some firms gave a rather 
analytical description of the main features of their incentive plans, others simply stated that 
equity incentives were granted to some key personnel in the group. Second, some firms made 
no mention of these instruments in the annual report. Nonetheless, it was clear from notes to 
the financial statement that directors of such firms actually held options to purchase or 
subscribe company shares. This was usually the case when the plan was approved in fiscal 
years prior to the financial statement in question. To compensate for the lack of data, at least 
in part, additional information was collected from annual reports of the previous year. This 
second phase of data collection allowed us to find more in-depth information on the features 
of the plans. However, the reticence of the firms in question prevented us from reconstructing 
a complete profile on every plan in the study. Unfortunately, companies almost never 
provided the fair value of the options (even in 2005) and rarely indicated the number of 
options and of recipients. 
Finally, to capture a more complete and contextual portrayal of the phenomenon under 
study, we collected more information on the diffusion and the characteristics of equity 
incentive plans adopted by Italian listed companies through different sources (specialized 
press – including the leading Italian economic newspaper, Il Sole 24 Ore – top management 
magazines, other articles and books). We used triangulation to examine the phenomenon from 
multiple perspectives, and to enrich our understanding of the object under investigation (Jick, 
1979). The supplementary evidence collected on the diffusion and characteristics of equity 
incentive plans played a relevant role in the investigation of cases of rent extraction. It is, in 
fact, difficult to find out traces of misbehavior through the analysis of annual reports. First, 
controlling shareholders wanting to extract company’s value at minority shareholders’ 
expenses would like to hide their opportunistic behavior to avoid sanctions. Second, the 
accounting and disclosure rules in vigor at that time could allow these subjects to hide the 
transfer of money from the company to their pocket.  
 
Measures and data analysis of logit model 
We used a logistic regression to investigate the relationship between the firm ownership 
structure and the use of equity incentive plans. In the statistical model, the dependent variable 
was the use of equity incentive plans, and the independent variable was the absence of a 
controlling shareholder, i.e. no shareholder has more than 30 per cent of firm’s shares (1=no 
controlling shareholder, 0=otherwise).  
The absence of a controlling shareholder. The threshold of 30 per cent is used to 
identify the presence or absence of a controlling shareholder. Despite previous international 
studies considered a threshold of about ten or twenty per cent (e.g. La Porta et al., 1999; 
Faccio and Lang, 2002), in this study we decided to adopt a higher threshold, equals to 30 per 
cent. We believe that the thresholds of ten or twenty per cent of shares are particularly 
suitable to investigate the presence of blockholders in the Anglo Saxon capitalism, where 
companies’ shareholding is more dispersed. These thresholds are not adequate to measure 
ownership structure in Continental Europe, where main shareholders own on average more 
than 30 per cent of company’s shares (e.g. Barca and Becht, 2001). Moreover, the threshold 
of 30 per cent is particularly relevant because each subject overcoming this threshold is 
obliged to launch a takeover on all company’s share. According to legal rules on takeovers, 
listed companies are considered contestable if the largest shareholding is lower than 30 per 
cent (Mosca and Angelillis, 2008).  
As control variables we considered (i) the identity of the ultimate owner (family or the 
State), (ii) the presence of syndicate agreements, (iii) the firm industry, (iv) the log market 
capitalization, (v) the listing in the previous five years, (vi) the presence of plans in 1998-
1999. 
The identity of the ultimate owner. We controlled for identity of two ultimate 
shareholders: families (1=yes, 0=otherwise) and the State (1=yes, 0=otherwise). Families are 
the dominant shareholder of a large number of Italian listed companies (Zattoni, 2006). 
Furthermore, as indicated by hypotheses 2, families may be tempted to use these mechanisms 
to extract value from the company at minority shareholders’ expenses. We controlled also for 
the State because previous studies on the diffusion of equity incentive plans in Italy showed 
that, in the past, State-owned companies used these instruments (Cesarini, 1986). The identity 
and the shareholding of the ultimate owner were collected through the Consob database.  
The presence of a syndicate agreement. We controlled also for the presence of syndicate 
agreements (1=yes, and 0=otherwise) because they are an important characteristic of the 
ownership structure of Italian listed companies. Such agreements are used to reinforce 
alliances among shareholders and are divided in two categories: voting syndicate agreements 
and blocking syndicate agreements (Gianfrate, 2007).  
The firm industry. We controlled also for industry as previous studies on Italian 
companies showed that equity incentive plans were more diffused among financial companies 
(Gualtieri, 1993). The rationale is that these companies have a more sophisticated financial 
culture and a longer tradition in the use of incentives related to financial performances. We 
measured the firm’s industry creating dummy variables for each category of the Stock 
Exchange: manufacturing, service, and financial companies. 
The log market capitalization. We controlled for firm size because it is supposed to 
positively affect the adoption of equity incentive plans. First, in large companies is more 
difficult to monitor management (Eaton and Rosen, 1983). Second, large companies have 
superior abilities of introducing governance devices as equity incentives because they usually 
have staff specialized in accounting, taxation and commercial law (Uchida, 2006). The market 
capitalization is measured in million euros at the end of 1999 and 2005. We then calculated its 
logarithm to control for heteroskedasticity. 
The listing in the five previous years. This variable is a dummy variable measuring if 
the company went public in the five previous years (1=yes, 0=otherwise). We controlled for 
this variable because companies going public usually adopt equity incentive plans to increase 
the IPO’s probability of success and to incentive management to value creation (Certo, Daily, 
Cannella, and Dalton, 2003).  
The presence of plans in 1998-1999. This variable measures if the company issued a 
plan in the previous period investigated in the study (1=yes, 0=otherwise). We introduced this 
variable because companies that have already adopted a plan are more likely to adopt plans in 
the future. 
 
Measures and data analysis of t-test for difference of means 
To compare the characteristics of equity incentive plans targeted to top managers and 
directors with plans targeted to a larger number of employees we used t-test for difference-of-
means. To this purpose, we used multiple levels of discrimination: (i) plans offered to less 
than 3 employees versus all other plans, (ii) plans offered to less than 10 employees versus all 
other plans, (iii) plans offered to directors versus all other plans. The thresholds of 3 and 10 
employees are aimed at capturing the lower and the upper limits of top management team’s 
size, as indicated by Hambrick (2005).  
Moreover, to understand if the tax law may be a driver of equity incentive plans we 
divided plans in two groups according to their date of approval: (i) plans issued in 1998-1999, 
and (ii) plans issued in 2004-2005. We then used t-test for difference-of-means to compare 
the characteristics of equity incentive plans issued in the two periods that, as we have seen, 
are characterized by different tax rules. 
 
RESULTS 
Equity incentives plans and ownership structure 
Table 2 shows the results of the analysis of the influence of ownership structure (absence of a 
controlling shareholder, ultimate shareholder as a family or the State, presence of a syndicate 
agreement), industry (service and finance), size (log market capitalization), and listing in the 
five previous years on the likelihood of adoption of equity incentive plans both in 1998-1999 
and 2004-2005. For 2004-2005 we controlled also for companies with plans issued in 1998-
1999.  
The logit models – see table 2 – reveal that equity incentive plans are significantly more 
likely in companies with larger capitalization (p<.001 in 98-99 and p <.01 in 04-05), and 
companies listed in the five previous years (p<.05 in 04-05), while they are less common in 
companies in the finance industry (p <.05 in 98-99)v. Our results emphasize that firm size is 
the most important antecedent of equity incentive plans’ adoption, while ownership structure 
does not have a significant impact on the use of these instruments. In sum, our findings do not 
support hypothesis 1. 
 
Insert table 2 about here 
 
Equity incentive plans and rent extraction 
We tested the differences between plans offered to top managers and directors and the ones 
offered to employees. The results do not support the existence of a significant difference 
between different groups of plans (see table 3, 4 and 5). In particular, our results show that the 
plans offered to less than 3 employees involve more often stock options (options = 1.00 
versus .84, p<.001) and less often stocks (shares = .00 versus .17, p<.001). Moreover, plans 
offered to less than 3 and less than 10 employees have a stronger connection with company’s 
results (company = 1.00 versus .68, p<.001), are less used to improve the employee’s 
identification with the company (identity = .00 versus .11, p<.01), and do not have lock up 
provisions (lock-up = .00 versus .83, p<001). Finally, plans offered to directors involve more 
often stock options (options = .96 versus .81, p<.05) and less often stocks (shares = .04 versus 
.20, p<.05), use less often a capital increase (capital increase = .74 versus .91, p<.01) and 
more often already issued shares (sell own shares = .26 versus .10, p<.01), have more often an 
exercise price at market value (market value = .80 versus .44, p<.001) and less often a market 
price lower than the market price (lower than market value = .20 versus .56, p<.001), and 
have a stronger connection with company’s results (company = .91 versus .64, p<.05).  
These results indicate that the characteristics of equity incentive plans issued by Italian 
listed companies do not significantly differ between elite and broad based plans. More in 
depth, plans issued to few employees or directors do not have a lower strike price and are 
connected more often with company’s results. The only symptom of rent extraction is the lack 
of lock up provisions for plans offered to top managers, but the absence of these mechanisms 
is not enough to support this conclusion. In sum, our findings do not show evident traces of 
misappropriation, and do not support hypothesis 2.  
 
Insert tables 3, 4, and 5 about here 
 
Unfortunately, companies do not provide the fair value of equity incentives offered to 
recipients – and do not state often the number of options and the number of beneficiaries – 
and so it has been impossible to identify the amount of value transferred to recipients with the 
plan. For this reason, results presented in tables 3, 4, and 5 do not allow us to draw significant 
conclusions about hypothesis 2. However, the analysis of articles published in newspapers 
and journals allowed us to find that some Italian companies offered generous equity incentive 
plans to major shareholders as managers or directors of the corporation. Among the others, we 
found also two cases that may be potentially considered as symptoms of controlling 
shareholders’ abuse. These examples do not prove that equity incentive plans have been 
systematically used to distribute a large amount of wealth to controlling shareholders. They 
showed, instead, that these mechanisms may have been used to this purpose. 
The first case regards Pirelli group, a large group operating in cables and tire industries. 
In September 2000, Pirelli sold its optical fiber division – incorporated in Optical 
Technologies – to Corning for more than 3 billion dollars (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2000a). The deal 
has been very profitable for Pirelli, whose capital gain was about 1.4 billion dollars. After the 
deal, commentators noticed some traces of potential abuse of the controlling shareholder (Il 
Sole 24 Ore, 2000b). First, the holding company (Camfin) – controlled by Tronchetti Provera 
family – increased its shareholding before the official announcement of the deal that pushed 
up the value of Pirelli’s shares. Second, media and investors discovered – only after the deal 
had been signed – the existence of an equity incentive plan offering the options to buy 12.5% 
of company’s equity to three top managers. The three top managers were the CEO and major 
shareholder of the company (that received 6% of the shares thanks to the plan), the CFO 
(2.5% of the shares), and the chief of the cable division (4% of the shares). The capital gains 
were enormous for Italian standards: they were respectively about 219 million dollars for the 
CEO, 128 million dollars for the chief of cable divisions, and 80 million dollars for the CFO. 
The amount of the capital gain and the lack of transparency before the signature of the deal 
led commentators to question the operation, although there were no legal implications for the 
subjects involved (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2000b).  
The second case regards CIR, a mid-cap financial company controlled by Cofide, 
another financial listed company. Both companies belong to a pyramidal group controlled by 
De Benedetti family. The CIR unification has been one of the clearest examples of market 
abuse before a favorable unification (Bigelli and Mehrotra, 2005). CIR was a dual-class 
shares company. Non-voting shares represented 22.5% of the firm’s equity. On September 
2000 the board proposed a 1:1 coercive unification of voting and non-voting shares, which 
was approved one month later. In the three days around the announcement date, the voting 
shares dropped by 6.73% while non-voting shares gained 6.44%. The majority shareholder 
took profit of this event both buying non-voting shares, and receiving stock option plans on 
non-voting shares before the unification. First, during the months of April and May 2000, 
Cofide had bought CIR non-voting shares and sold CIR voting shares. Second, in 1999, a 
stock option plan based on non-voting shares was approved by the CIR’s board of directors. 
The first exercise date was set on December 1999, and all board members exercised their 
stock options on that date. The CEO (a member of the controlling family) exercised his stock 
options for 2 million shares on that date. In March 2000, six months before the unification 
announcement, the board approved a new stock option plan based on non-voting shares. 
Unfortunately for the controlling shareholder, the stock market decline in April 2000 (due to 
the collapse of the Internet bubble) and these new options remained underwater (Bigelli and 
Mehrotra, 2005). The lack of transparency on the stock option plan before the company’s 
unification led commentators to question the operation, but also in this case there were no 
legal implications for the subjects involved. 
 
Equity incentive plans and tax rules 
Finally, we tested differences between plans offered in 1998-99 and plans offered in 2004-05. 
Our results (see table 6) show that (i) the plans offered in the two time periods – characterized 
by different tax regulations – differ significantly in almost all their characteristics; (ii) the 
specific features of equity incentive plans generally comply with all the requirements in tax 
regulations so that fiscal benefits can be accessed. In particular, plans issued in 2004-2005 are 
characterized by a larger adoption of previously issued shares (sell own shares = .18 versus 
.09, p<.10), a larger use of an exercise price offered at market value (market value = .91 
versus .17, p<.001), and a larger involvement of directors (directors = .40 versus .13, p<001).  
Despite the fact that annual reports rarely make specific reference to fiscal advantages, 
our results show a strong link between fiscal regulations and the use of equity incentive plans. 
In sum, our results support hypothesis 3.  
 
Insert table 6 about here 
 
DISCUSSION 
We believe our findings contribute to expand the traditional knowledge on reasons behind the 
adoption of equity incentive plans outside Anglo-Saxon countries, and support a symbolic 
perspective of corporate governance, according to which the introduction of new governance 
practices may not imply substantive governance reforms. 
 
The reasons behind the adoption of equity incentive plans 
Three rationales may explain the diffusion and the characteristics of equity incentive plans. 
They are (i) the optimal contracting view, (ii) the rent extraction view, and (iii) the perceived-
cost view. Our results do not support the first and the second rationale, while they are coherent 
with the third one. 
With respect to the first rationale, our results show that the absence of a controlling 
shareholder does not have a significant impact on the adoption of equity incentive plans. 
These plans are not extensively used to align shareholders and managers’ interests in presence 
of the separation between ownership and control as it is in the Anglo-Saxon public companies 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990). These instruments are, instead, more diffused in larger 
companies that have superior abilities to introduce complex governance devices – as equity 
incentive plans – because they employ specialists in accounting, taxation and commercial law 
(Uchida, 2006). The adoption of these plans by larger companies may be explained also 
considering that the international labor market is an important driver behind their diffusion 
(Cheffins and Thomas, 2004), and that this market exerts greater pressure on larger 
companies. This conclusion is coherent with previous studies on the Italian context showing 
that, especially in the first period of their adoption, only a small number of plans establish a 
strong link between employees’ compensation and company performance. Most of the plans 
assign instead a positive supplementary compensation which can vary significantly when 
there are major fluctuations in share value (Zattoni, 2006).  
The second rationale provides a more convincing explanation of why equity incentive 
plans have become so widespread in Italy and what characteristics these plans have. Unlike 
the US, where the critical problem of corporate governance is the ease with which managers 
misappropriate value from shareholders, in Italy (and in many other Continental European 
countries) the dilemma centers on the structural conflict of interest between majority and 
minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). A concentrated share structure gives rise to the 
risk that controlling shareholders take profit of their position to expropriate minority 
shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000). As we argued before, controlling shareholders of Italian 
listed companies are usually directors and also top managers of their companies (e.g. Melis, 
1999; Molteni, 1997), and have the power to influence the board decision making (Melis, 
1999 and 2000). As shareholders, they may approve extremely generous equity incentive 
plans for themselves as top managers or directors of the firm. Our results did not show a large 
scale evidence of controlling shareholder’s abuse, also because the lack of transparency did 
not allow understanding all features of the plans. However, we presented two cases of 
potential abuse indicating that these instruments may have been used to this purpose 
especially in the first years of their diffusion. The hypothesis of potential rent extraction is 
supported also by the results of a recent study that analyzed the characteristics of 168 stock 
option plans implemented in the time frame 2004-2006 by Italian non financial listed 
companies (Melis, Carta, and Gaia, 2008). Melis, Carta and Gaia conclude, in fact, stating 
that “… the diffusion of stock option plans in Italian non financial listed companies can 
hardly be explained by optimal contracting theory” and that “other competing theories, such 
as rent-extraction theory, seem to provide more powerful explanation of corporate reality…” 
(Melis et al., 2008: 16).  
The third rationale is the most important in explaining the dissemination and features of 
these instruments among Italian companies. In this country (and elsewhere) two variables 
have played a key role in the rise in popularity of these tools: no record of relative costs and 
tax benefits on income generated from these plans (Hall and Murphy, 2000). As for the first, 
in Italy there was in that period no legislation requiring that the cost of a plan be recorded on 
the profit and loss account if options were granted free of charge (as is always the case). 
Despite the fact that not a single company cites the lack of cost accounting as a reason for 
adopting these plans, this factor may have facilitated the spread of these instruments in Italy 
and other countries (Zattoni, 2006). The same is true regarding tax laws: while almost no 
company indicated fiscal benefits as an impetus for implementing an equity incentive plan, 
the widespread dissemination of these instruments came about only after strong incentives 
were integrated into new fiscal regulations (Zattoni, 2006). Our results show that the formal 
features of these plans respect the requirements set down in fiscal norms in order to access tax 
benefits, and evolve with the change in the tax law. On the basis of this evidence, our study 
supports the perceived cost view – and in particular the impact of tax regulation – as the main 
rationale behind the rise in popularity of these tools. 
 
The diffusion of new governance practices 
A number of studies have examined the diffusion of organizational practices among 
corporations (e.g. Strang and Soule, 1998; Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell, 1997; Zucker, 
1983). The large majority of contributions on the diffusion of new practices implies a binary 
approach of adoption/non-adoption, and treats the practices themselves as relatively 
unchanging and uniform. With few exceptions, prior research has focused on the adoption of 
new practices per se, without considering the adequacy of the instruments with the firm’s 
characteristics, or their implications for firms’ stakeholders (Fiss and Zajac, 2004). Our study 
analyzed, instead, both the diffusion and characteristics of new governance practices.  
Our findings suggest that the adoption of equity incentive plans has been a subtle way 
for decoupling, i.e. maintaining external legitimacy and serving the interests of powerful 
leaders at the same time (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Westphal and Zajac, 2001). In particular, 
the study contributes to explain some neglected aspects of institutional decoupling, i.e. the 
conditions favoring its appearance and its consequences for the company and the stakeholders 
(e.g. Westphal and Zajac, 1998 and 2001). About the first issue, our results show that the lack 
of previous experience with these instruments and the ambiguity implicit in their use (i.e. their 
apparent shareholder value orientation versus their potential use to extract company value or 
to reduce labor costs) favored the decoupling process. About its consequences, the results 
suggest that decoupling happens not only because it is effective for the organization (e.g. 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977), but also because it serves the interests of powerful corporate 
leaders (e.g. Westphal and Zajac, 2001). 
Our findings are consistent with a symbolic perspective on corporate governance, 
according to which symbolic actions (i.e. the introduction of equity incentive plans) can 
engender significant positive stockholder reactions without implying substantive governance 
reforms (e.g. Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Westphal and Zajac, 1998; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). 
The empirical evidence collected in this study shows that equity incentive plans – due to their 
implicit ambiguity, the low transparency on their features, and the lack of previous experience 
in their use – are among the most suitable mechanisms available to Italian controlling 
shareholders to extract value from the company at the minority shareholders’ expense 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2006) or to reduce the tax burden on the labor costs (Hall and Murphy, 
2003). As such, our findings question the dominant assumption that there is an international 
convergence of good governance practices (e.g. Gordon and Roe, 2004), and underline that 
the presumed convergence may be more symbolic than substantive (Wetsphal and Zajac, 
2001).   
 
Practical implications and limitations 
Equity incentive plans – and especially stock option plans – are means which top managers 
and majority shareholders may use to expropriate minority shareholders with little 
transparence and low risk (Bebchuk and Fried, 2006). The risk of misappropriation is very 
high if – as it happen in Italy and in other countries – public information on these plans does 
not allow stakeholders to reconstruct all their features.  
The best remedy for protecting against this risk lies in shoring up disclosure policies on 
executive compensation packages, which are typically weak outside the United States (Buck, 
Shahrim, and Winter, 2004). Requiring firms to make detailed, timely information available 
before and after issuing equity incentives can be beneficial in terms of enhancing transparency 
and reducing risks associated with the use of these instruments (Cheffins and Thomas, 2004; 
Conyon, 2001). In addition, the design process of these plans must be managed cautiously to 
prevent potential recipients from influencing the features of these mechanisms to their own 
advantage. This objective can be achieved, for example, by delegating plan design to a 
compensation committee made up of independent directors, or to independent consultants 
nominated by this committee (Sykes, 2002). Moreover, the watchdog role of institutional 
investors is crucial in assuring the respect of the fair treatment of all shareholders (Shleifer 
and Visnhy, 1997).  
Finally, one should ask if it is correct to treat equity incentive plans differently from any 
other incentive tool, both from accounting and fiscal standpoints (Lee, 2002). The 
requirement to record the effects of stock option plans according to the fair value method 
(IFRS2 - share-based payments), and the evolution of tax laws, clearly signal the desire to 
limit or to eliminate the accounting and fiscal advantages that have facilitated the 
dissemination of these instruments (Zattoni, 2006). 
Before concluding, we acknowledge the limitations of our study. First, we focused on 
Italy, because we believe it is particularly interesting investigating the phenomenon in this 
country. In fact, both the lack of equity incentive plans until the end of the ‘90s and the 
presence of large blockholders make Italy a particularly interesting setting. However, we 
acknowledge that corporate governance practices are in some way country specific, and so we 
invite scholars to collect evidence on the diffusion and the characteristics of equity incentive 
plans in other countries. The second main limitation of the study is the lack of complete data 
on the characteristics of equity incentive plans adopted by Italian companies. This is due to 
the incompleteness of the public information on these plans. We hope future studies will fill 
this gap collecting richer and more complete data either in Italy – if the information will be 
disclosed – or in other countries. We also hope that complete or richer information on these 
plans will allow scholars to make a robust analysis of the relationship between their 
characteristics and companies’ ones.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article investigated the diffusion and the characteristics of equity incentive plans adopted 
by Italian listed companies. Evidence from our study indicates that the diffusion of equity 
incentive plans and the evolution of their characteristics may be explained by the perceived-
cost view, and to a less extent by the rent extraction view. In this sense, the study expands 
traditional understanding of institutional decoupling, providing more empirical evidence on 
its antecedents and consequences. About the first issue, our results underline that new 
governance practices – especially if ambiguous, not well known before, and with an implicit 
incentive to create value – may be used by powerful actors to misappropriate other 
stakeholders or to pursue other advantages (i.e. to have access to tax benefits). About the 
second issue, our findings show that decoupling may not only produce positive effects for the 
organization, but may also benefit some powerful corporate leaders at the expense of other 
stakeholders. . 
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Table 1: The main characteristics of Italian listed companies at the end of 1999 and at the end of 2005 
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  19 
  58 
Market capitalization 
(mean in million euro) 
8,721 
 
1,114 3,000 4,648 2,091 2,681 
Companies listed in the 
previous five years 
22 58 80 26 67 93 
Sources of data: (i) Italian Stock Exchange for industry and market capitalization of listed companies; (ii) 





Table 2. Logit models on the relationship between ownership structure and equity incentive plan’s adoption 
 1998-1999 2004-2005 
 Coefficient Std Error Coefficient Std Error 
Constant     -5.99*** .95     -4.24*** .82 
Absence of a controlling shareholder  -.11 .46   .54 .45 
Ultimate family   .31 .46   .33 .45 
Ultimate State   .01 .79  -.50 .80 
Syndicate agreements   .39 .40   .56 .38 
Service industry  -.24 .55  -.18 .43 
Financial industry  -1.24* .49  -.21 .45 
Log mkt cap      1.78*** .29       .80** .26 
Listed in the previous 5 years   .32 .38     .75* .38 
Plans in 1998-1999 - -   .67 .45 
Number of observations 59 57 
χ2 64.03*** 30.91*** 
† p < .10; * p< .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.  
Table 3. T-tests for difference-of-means between plans offered to less than 3 employees and all other plans vi 
Characteristics of equity incentive plans Plans offered to less than 3 
employees 
All other plans 
  Mean Std 
Error 
N° Mean Std Error N° 
1) Content Options      1.00*** .00 12   .84 .03 168 
 Shares        .00*** .00 12   .17 .03 166 
2) Method Capital increase  .83 .11 12   .88 .03 150 
 Sell own shares  .17 .11 12   .13 .03 150 
3) Price Market value  .67 .14 12   .54 .04 143 
 Lower than market value  .33 .14 12   .46 .04 143 
4) Parameters Individual  .33 .21   6   .19 .05   73 
 Company      1.00*** .00   7   .68 .05   73 
5) Goal Incentive  .89 .11   9   .94 .02   99 
 Retain  .59 .17   9   .55 .05   99 
 Identity      .00** .00   9   .10 .03   99 
6) Time horizon Entire plan 4.89 .65   9 4.80 .20 138 
 Vesting period 1.50 .22 10 1.92 .10 112 
7) Lock-up         .00*** .00   3   .83 .19   39 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.  
 
Table 4. T-tests for difference-of-means between plans offered to less than 10 employees and all other plans  
Characteristics of equity incentive plans Plans offered to less than 10 
employees 
All other plans 
  Mean Std Error N° Mean Std Error N° 
1) Content Options   .94 .06 17   .84 .03 163 
 Shares   .06 .06 17   .17 .03 161 
2) Method Capital increase   .88 .08 16   .88 .03 146 
 Sell own shares   .13 .08 16   .14 .03 146 
3) Price Market value   .56 .13 16   .55 .04 139 
 Lower than market value   .44 .13 16   .45 .04 139 
4) Parameters Individual   .29 .18   7   .19 .05   72 
 Company      1.00*** .00   8   .68 .05   72 
5) Goal Incentive  .85 .10 13   .95 .02   95 
 Retain  .46 .14 13   .58 .05   95 
 Identity      .00** .00 13   .11 .03   95 
6) Time horizon Entire plan 4.93 .67 14 4.79 .21 133 
 Vesting period 1.78 .26 14 1.90 .10 108 
7) Lock-up    .00*** .00   4   .85 .19   38 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.  
 
Table 5. T-tests for difference-of-means between plans offered to directors and all other plans  
Characteristics of equity incentive plans Plans offered to directors All other plans 
  Mean Std Error N° Mean Std Error N° 
1) Content Options   .96* .03 49   .81 .04 122 
 Shares   .04* .03 47   .20 .04 122 
2) Method Capital increase     .74** .07 38   .91 .03 117 
 Sell own shares     .26** .07 38   .10 .03 117 
3) Price Market value       .80*** .06 41   .44 .05 107 
 Lower than market value       .20*** .06 41   .56 .05 107 
4) Parameters Individual .17 .08 23   .20 .05   55 
 Company   .91* .06 23   .64 .06   56 
5) Goal Incentive  .96 .04 28   .93 .03   75 
 Retain  .46 .10 28   .60 .06   75 
 Identity  .14 .07 28   .08 .03   75 
6) Time horizon Entire plan 4.83 .34 40 4.90 .25   99 
 Vesting period 2.08 .17 42 1.78 .12   69 
7) Lock-up    .88 .48   8   .76 .20   32 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.  
 
Table 6. T-tests for difference-of-means between plans issued in 1998-99 and plans issued in 2004-05vii 
Characteristics of equity incentive plans Plans issued in 1998-1999 Plans issued in 2004-2005 
  Mean Std Error N° Mean Std Error N° 
1) Content Options       .68*** .05 80   .99 .01 101 
 Shares       .34*** .05 80   .01 .01   98 
2) Recipients Managers     .85** .04 80   .65 .05   98 
 Employees     .13** .04 80   .28 .04   99 
 Directors       .13*** .04 80   .40 .05   99 
3) Method Capital increase .91 .03 79   .84 .04   83 
 Sell own shares  .09† .03 79   .18 .04   83 
4) Price Market value       .17*** .04 76   .91 .03   79 
 Lower than market value       .83*** .04 76   .09 .03   79 
5) Parameters Individual   .30† .08 33   .13 .05   46 
 Company .74 .08 34   .70 .07   46 
6) Goal Incentive .93 .03 56   .94 .03   52 
 Retain     .43** .07 56   .71 .06   52 
 Identity .09 .04 56   .10 .04   52 
7) Time horizon Entire plan     4.07*** .27 61 5.33 .26   86 
 Vesting period 1.55* .18 36 2.02 .11   86 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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i Equity incentive plans are usually classified in two broad categories: 1) stock option plans, in which the 
recipient has the option to buy or subscribe company stocks; 2) non stock option plans, which involve employee 
rewards (either stocks or cash), again, linked to the value of the company’s stock (Rodrick, 2000). Trying to 
avoid confusion with similar concepts and terms, in this article we used the following definitions: (i) equity 
incentive plans to indicate both stock option and non stock options plans; (ii) stocks or shares to define equity 
shares, i.e. shares of ownership in a corporation; (iii) stock option plans to indicate plans in which the recipients 
have the option to buy or subscribe company stocks; (iv) stock granting plans to indicate plans in which the 
recipients receive company stocks. 
ii The white paper of the Ministry of Industry and Foreign Commerce states that a stock option plan “is useful 
both to attract management in the first phases of firm life cycle, and to let employees participate to the 
distribution of the firm value they contributed to create” (Ministero dell’Industria e del Commercio Estero, 2000, 
35). The Italian code of good governance states, instead, in principle 8.2 that: “… the board of directors, in 
defining the compensation policies for CEOs, should establish that part of their pay is tied to the firm economic 
performance and, eventually, to the attainment of objectives defined ex ante by the board”. 
iii The new legislation, which took effect on 1 January 2000, eliminated the tax exemption on the shares received 
through an equity incentive plan and imposed the recipients to pay 12.5% on the capital gain. Also with the new 
rule, Italian tax law continued to favor the dissemination of equity incentive plans because at the time of sale of 
stocks received through them, the recipient was required to pay 12.5% of any surcharge, when applicable, equal 
to the difference between the sale price and the “normal” value (market value in the case of a listed company) 
when stocks were purchased (Autuori, 2001). 
iv The term ownership structure may indicate both control rights and cash-flow rights (e.g. Hansmann, 1988). In 
this article, we used the term “ownership structure” to indicate “the distribution of rights related to capital”. This 
choice is valid if we assume that companies follow the rule “one share-one vote”. We think this may be the case 
because (i) we did not consider explicitly the issue of the separation between ownership and control, (ii) we 
measured direct ownership and not ultimate ownership that may present a much higher divergence between 
control and cash-flow rights (e.g. Marchica and Mura, 2005), (iii) Italian listed companies have strongly reduced 
their use of dual class shares along the time (Zattoni, 2006). 
v We measured the absence of a controlling shareholder using also the threshold of 20 per cent. The results of the 
analysis using this variable are almost identical to that one presented in table 2. For this reason we decided to not 
report them in the text. 
vi The column “N” presents the number of plans considered respectively in the two preceding columns. 
vii The characteristics of equity incentive plans that are relevant for the analysis of the impact of changes in tax 
law are: (i) directors as recipient category, (ii) sell own shares as technical method, and (iii) market value as 
price of issuance of stocks. 
 
